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JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is properly based upon the
transfer of case no. 88-0464 by the Utah Supreme Court to this
court under Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the
Defendants entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel on June 6, 1988,
and an Order denying Plaintiffs1 Motion for a New Trial and to
Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence entered on October
26, 1988.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Motion

to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence Under Rule 15 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where evidence concerning the
issues of mistake and illegality was presented and tried at trial
without objection by the opposing party?
2.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to

sustain a finding that the Defendants made a number of
representations either negligently and/or fraudulently which
induced the Plaintiffs to act to their detriment and thereby
causing Plaintiffs to sustain substantial damages?
3.

Did the trial judge err in basing his decision on his

physical inspection of the property as it appeared at the time of
trial without foundation for the view regarding its appearance at
the time of Plaintiffs' purchase in 1982?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. Sandersf
appeal from a judgment allowing Defendants to foreclose upon their
Trust Deed and awarding them money damages. Plaintiffs then filed
a Motion for a New Trial and to Amend Their Pleadings to Conform
to the Evidence Presented at Trial. The court denied that Motion
on October 26, 1988. Plaintiffs appeal both those Orders.
In March of 1979, Defendants Ovard purchased two acres of
property from Mr. Layne Newman. (Trial Transcript, (hereinafter
"Tr.") 58, Trial Exhibits 12-D and 13-D) That transaction was
accomplished by two trust deeds, each covering one acre. (Tr. 206)
At approximately the same time, Mr. Ovard and Mr. Newman submitted
a request for a variance to the City of Draper. (Tr. 61, Trial
Exhibit 7-P)

Their request was accompanied by a plat showing five

acres divided into a three-acre lot (Mr. Newman's) and a two-acre
lot (Mr. Ovard1s). (Tr. 61, Trial Exhibit 6-P)

The City of Draper

granted them a variance to build one home on each lot subject to
three conditions. (Tr. 61, 64, Trial Exhibit 8-P)

Mr. Ovard then

constructed his home on the two-acre parcel.
In July of 1982, the Sanders purchased the home built by
Martin Ovard in Draper, Utah. (Tr. 151) Soon after occupying that
home, they became aware of some activity on the unimproved acre
directly to the north of their property which indicated that the
land might be sold and built upon. (Tr. 152)

Plaintiffs feared

that construction on that adjoining acre would diminish their

enjoyment of their property. (Tr. 153)

Therefore, Plaintiffs

decided to make inquiries into purchasing the property for
themselves.
Joseph Sanders contacted Fred Hale, the realtor who had
sold them their residence. (Tr. 153)

He explained that he and his

wife might be interested in buying the adjoining property in order
to prevent someone else from building upon it. (Tr. 155)

They

examined the listing agreement and a plat map which had been
supplied by the Defendants' realtor and agreed to make an offer on
the property owned by the Ovards. (Tr. 153)

The amount of their

offer was based in part upon the asking price for other parcels of
the same approximate size which could be built upon. (Tr. 156,
157)

Plaintiff paid $26,000.00 for the land. (R. 201, Trial

Exhibits 1-P, 2-P and 3-P)
Subsequent to this time, Plaintiffs inadvertently learned
that the unimproved north parcel was to be sold in a tax sale.
(Tr. 159)

Further investigation led Mr. Sanders to the discovery

that the parcel he had purchased from the Defendants and the
parcel upon which his residence was situated, had been split by
the Defendants. (Tr. 17)

Mr. Sanders further learned that both

parcels were subject to a variance which imposed certain
conditions upon the land and that the City of Draper would not
issue a building permit for the unimproved property. (Tr. 168)
Plaintiffs approached Defendants in the hopes of resolving
this matter informally and offered to reduce the purchase price to
an amount which approximated the property's true value as an
unimprovable lot. (Tr. 171)

Negotiations broke down and when

Plaintiffs refused to make any further payments on the property,
Defendants initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. (Tr.
171)
Plaintiffs filed this fraud action in the Third Judicial
District Court and the matter was tried before the Honorable Frank
G. Noel on October 26 and 27, 1987.

At the conclusion of those

proceedings, Plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings to conform to
the evidence.

Judge Noel took the matter under advisement until

he had an opportunity to physically inspect the property. (R. 142)
The court issued a memorandum opinion on December 4, 1987,
finding in favor of the Defendants on their counter-claim and
finding no cause of action on Plaintiffs' complaint. (R. 142-143)
The court's decision sets forth certain observations about the
property which were not consistent with the appearance of the
property when purchased by the Plaintiffs in 1982. (R. 142-143)
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for a New Trial and to
Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence (R. 222)

The trial

court denied both of those Motions and Plaintiffs now appeal
seeking a new trial. (R. 255)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

mandates that pleadings be amended to conform to evidence which is
heard without objection at trial.

Evidence was presented at trial

on the issues of illegality and mistake and Defendants impliedly
consented to the introduction of those issues.

Therefore, Judge

Noel erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Pleadings.

II.

The evidence presented at trial is sufficient to

sustain a finding of common law fraud and/or negligent
misrepresentation on the part of the Defendants.

Plaintiffs1

reliance on those representations was reasonable and they were
subsequently damaged as a direct result of their reliance in
purchasing the property in question from the Defendants.
III.

While it is proper for a trier of fact to view real

property to clarify testimony at trial/ it is improper for a trial
judge to view premises for the purpose of determining facts not in
evidence.

Further, the power to view should be exercised with

extreme caution where there is a likelihood that the condition of
the property has changed with the passage of time.

The judge

relied upon his view of the property in finding that Plaintiffs
did not exercise due diligence in investigating the property they
were purchasing in 1982; this constitutes a reversible error.

ARGUMENT
I.

RULE 15(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
MANDATES THAT PLEADINGS BE AMENDED TO CONFORM TO
EVIDENCE WHICH IS ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION.

Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (attached
as Addendum A) addresses the amendment of pleadings to conform to
the evidence.

It reads in relevant part:

(1) When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion
of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure
so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of
these issues.

a.

Illegality*

In the trial of this matter the issues of illegality and
mistake were raised and proved by Plaintiffs' counsel and tried
with the implied consent of the Defendants.
There was evidence introduced at trial by Plaintiffs'
trial counsel regarding the illegal division of Ovardfs property
into two one-acre parcels.

The variance he received from the City

of Draper, which allowed him to build on his land, was for one
house on a two-acre parcel. (Tr. 61, Trial Exhibit 6-P)

Thomas L.

Spencer, the development director for the City of Draper,
testified that the split of the two acres by Ovard, which occurred
subsequent to the incorporation of the City of Draper, was subject
to all the land use regulations for the city. (Tr. 17)
Q:

And in researching the files (on the subject property),
what did you determine needed to be done to obtain a
building permit?

A:

It appeared from the information in the files that the
property in question had been a second split of the
property, of the original property, from the time the city
had incorporated, and would have to meet all the
subdivision regulations.

Q:

Why is that significant?

What are the subdivision

regulations here?
A:

It entails a whole section on our land use regulations.

Q:

Could you direct me to access; what would be required?
Perhaps you could just summarize those and tell me what

would be required regarding access to comply with the
subdivision requirement.
A:

Generally speaking, access has to be by a dedicated street
of a minimum right away (sic) width of 50 feet.

Mr. Spencer then testified that the subdivision regulations were
in effect in November of 1982. (Tr. 19)
Q:

Could a building permit have been issued on the lot of Mr.
Sanders in November of 1982?

A:

Yes, had they met all the subdivision regulations.

Q:

Including access?

A:

Including access.
In his cross-examination of Mr. Spencer, Defendants1

counsel raised the possibility of a variance which might allow
development on the north acre. (Tr. 23)
Q:

Under the ordinances that were in effect in November of
198 2, it would not be a given that you could not get a
variance for a building on a lot that was not adjacent to
a dedicated street; isn't that right?

A:

Under the current land use regulations the process first
would be determined whether he had to meet the subdivision
requirements or not.

That would be determined by probably

the Planning Commission and the City Counsel, (sic)

If it

was determined that they do not have to be processed as a
subdivision, then they would still have to receive a
conditional use permit from the Planning Commission and
probably a variance from the Board of Adjustments.

While it is true that the minimum right of way regulation can be
circumvented with a variance, Mr. Ovard did not apply for another
variance showing a division of the two acres before he sold the
one-acre parcel to Mr. Sanders.
Utah state law is quite clear about the legality of the
division and sale of the Ovard property.

§57-5-3 Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended) (attached as Addendum B) sets forth in detail
the procedure for legally subdividing property.

That statute

requires that, "if the land is situated in any city or
incorporated town such plat or map shall be approved by its
governing body, or by some city or town officer for that purpose
designated by resolution or ordinance of such governing body; . .
.

H

Mr. Ovard's division of his two acres into two one-acre

parcels did not comply with this requirement.

That chapter of the

Utah Code continues in §57-5-5 (attached as Addendum B) which
reads:
If any person shall sell any lot so platted according
to such plat before it is made out, acknowledged, filed
and recorded as aforesaid, such person whall be guilty of
a misdemeanor for each lot which he shall sell.
Mr. Ovard never acknowledged, filed and recorded his division of
the two acres.

Therefore he clearly violated this statute, as

well as a number of the Draper City ordinances relating to the
proper subdivision of real property, when he sold the vacant north
acre to Mr. Sanders.

This evidence of illegality supports a

finding in favor of the Plaintiffs.

This point was argued by

Plaintiffs' counsel during and subsequent to the trial and
Defendants never raised any objection. (Tr. 175f 178, 179; R.
227-228)
The elements of both unilateral and mutual mistake are
supported by the evidence presented at trial and it was an error
for the court not to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings
to conform to that evidence.
b.

Mistake.

Mr. Sanders believed that the lot he purchased from the
Ovards was a lot which could be developed. (Tr. 157)

This belief

was reasonable in light of the facts established at trial.

For

example, a realtor and some potential buyers had staked out the
outline of a home on the vacant acre next to Mr. Sanders' home.
(Tr. 152, 153)

The purchase price of the parcel was comparable to

similarly sized lots which were developable in that area, the plat
map shown to Mr. Sanders by the realtor indicated an access road
passing through the lot where his home was located to the vacant
back lot and there were homes being constructed on apparent lots
on either side of his home. (Tr. 156-158)

In other words, it

appeared to be a legal subdivision.
The first part of Rule 15(b) has been interpreted as a
mandatory requirement that the trial court grant leave to amend
pleadings to conform to the evidence to include issues tried by
the express or implied consent of the parties.

Lloyd's Unlimited

v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah App.

1988); Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983).

This

court most recently addressed the interpretation of Rule 15(b) in
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987).

In that case the

court addressed the question of "implied consent" and found that
it would exist "where one party raises an issue material to the
other party's case or where evidence is introduced without
objection, where it appears 'that the parties understood the
evidence to be aimed at the unpleaded issues.'M

I_d_. at 785.

The

court went on to state that the test for deciding whether
pleadings should be deemed amended under Rule 15(b) is "whether
the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it
could offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a
different theory."

Id.

In the present case, the elements of illegality and
mistake were supported by uncontested evidence.

The Defendants

had ample opportunity to introduce evidence supporting the
legality of Mr. Ovard's actions in dividing up his two-acre
parcel.

In addition, Plaintiffs initially made a verbal Motion to

Amend at the conclusion of their case. (Tr. 200)

At that time,

Defendants were put on notice of Plaintiffs' intent to argue that
there were issues of mistake involved in that matter.

Defendants

had the opportunity to rebut and defend the issue of mistake in
presenting their case to the court.
In this case, as in Colman v. Colman, there is no
indication in the record that the Defendants were surprised or

otherwise disadvantaged in addressing the issues of mistake and
illegality.

Under the first part of Rule 15(b)/ it is mandatory

that the trial court grant leave to amend pleadings to conform to
the evidence to include issues tried by the express or implied
consent of the parties.

Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99; Lloyd's

Unlimited/ 753 P.2d 507, 509.

The judge's failure to grant

Plaintiffs' Motion is adequate basis for reversing his decision
and granting Plaintiffs a new trial.

II.

THE FACTS SUPPORT A FINDING OF FRAUD AND
MISREPRESENTATION.

The elements of common law fraud in Utah are set forth in
the case of Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952),

Those

elements are:
1.

a representation made concerning a presently

existing material fact which was false;
2.

the representor either knew it to be false or

made it recklessly knowing he had insufficient knowledge
upon which to base such representation;
3.

the representation was made for the purpose of

inducing the other party to act upon it and that the other
party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity
did so, in fact, rely upon it;
4.
Id. at 274, 275.

the party induced to act is injured and damaged.
These elements have been interpreted and applied

in subsequent cases, the most relevant one being Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) .

In Dugan, a parcel of land had been listed as comprising
22-3/4 acres.

Apparently, less than half that amount was usable

land because some acres lay beneath a river bed.

The trial court

found the vendor not liable for fraud apparently because it was
unconvinced the vendor had knowledge of the falsity of his
representation.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, explaining:
[i]n a case where the circumstances impose upon the
vendor a special duty to know the truth of his
representations or where the nature of the situation is
such the vendor is presumed to know the facts to which his
representation relates, a misrepresentation is fraudulent
even though not made knowingly, willfully or with actual
intent to deceive. . • .

'The reason, of course, is that the parties to a real
estate transaction do not deal on equal terms. An owner
is presumed to know the boundaries of his own land, the
quantity of his acreage, and the amount of water
available. If he does not know the correct information,
he must find out or refrain from making representations to
unsuspecting strangers. Even honesty in making a mistake
is no defense as it is incumbent upon the vendor to know
the facts.•
Dugan v. Jones at 1246.

Even though the misrepresentation of

acreage had been innocently made, the Defendants were found to
have negligently misrepresented the facts.
a.

The Representations Made by Defendants Were Inaccurate
and Made Fraudulently and/or Negligently.

The Sanders contend that the judge erred in ruling that
the statements and omissions relied upon by the Plaintiffs were
not fraudulent nor were they made negligently. (Tr. 64)

The

record establishes that Defendant Ovard applied for a variance

with Layne Newman to build one home on a two-acre parcel of
property. (Tr. 64, Trial Exhibits 6-P and 7-P) (attached as
Addenda C and D)

At approximately the same time, he was

purchasing those two acres from Layne Newman under two earnest
money agreements. (Trial Exhibits 12-D and 13-D) (attached as
Addenda E and F)

At one time, Mr. Newman had submitted a plat

showing five one-acre lots for approval by Draper City. (Trial
Exhibit 15-P) (attached as Addendum G)

That petition was denied

but Mr. Newman continued to use those plat designations in
dividing the two acres he was selling to Mr. Ovard. (Tr. 59-60)
Mr. Ovard knew that the two-acre parcel was not legally subdivided
and that is why his application for the variance shows just one
two-acre lot. (Trial Exhibit 6-P)

The City of Draper granted the

Newman-Ovard variance for two homes (with the Ovard home to be
built on two acres-not one) on April 12, 1979. (Trial Exhibit 8-P)
(attached as Addendum H)
Sometime later, Ovard encountered financial difficulties
while constructing his home and deeded a portion of his interest
in one of those artificially and illegally created "lots" to his
father as security for a loan. (Tr. 65)

He was eventually forced

to sell the home on the southern acre and that home was
subsequently purchased by the Sanders.
Still encountering financial trouble, Mr. Ovard listed the
vacant northern acre with Gerry Whipple, a real estate agent.
Whipple testified that Sam Ovard gave him a plat resembling

Mr.

Exhibit 15-P, showing the two-acre parcel divided into two lots,
never explaining that the two acres were not legally subdivided.
(Tr. 81)

Ovard admitted not telling Mr. Whipple about the

variance on the property which had imposed a number of
requirements on the two-acre parcel. (Tr. 71, 82)

In addition,

the listing agreement described the property as "down a private
lane to tree-lined seclusion/" with access to utilities,
deliberately giving the impression that the site would be
developed. (Tr. 83-86, Trial Exhibit 10-P) (attached as Addendum
I)

The plat did not accurately represent the status of the

two-acre parcel.
the variance.

The Ovards failed to disclose the existence of

The representations and omissions were and/or made

negligently with the intent of securing a buyer for that property
at an inflated price.
When the Ovards caused their property to be listed through
the Mulitiple Listing Service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors,
the listing showed the property as zoned A-1. (Trial Exhibit 10-P)
The meaning of the zoning designation at that time was
agricultural with a single dwelling built on a one-acre lot. (Tr.
83)

Again, the implication raised by the listing was that the

property was developable which was intended to secure top dollar
for that property even though the Ovards knew that the property
could not be built upon without the approval of the city. (Tr. 71,
214)
When the Sanders began to suspect that someone might
purchase the north acre of land, they made inquiries into

purchasing that property and relied upon the aforementioned
representations in their decision to purchase the property for
$26,000.00. (Tr. 156-157)

Their decision was based on the theory

that they could eventually sell that lot to a party wishing to
build a home on it for an amount in the neighborhood of what they
paid for it. (Tr. 156)
b.

Plaintiffs' Reliance on Defendants' Representations
Was Reasonable.

The judge found that the Plaintiffs failed to exercise
"due diligence" to determine the status of the property in their
failure to be alerted to access problems to the property.

This

conclusion is directly contrary to the evidence.
1.

The Subdivision Plat
(Trial Exhibit 15-Pf attached as Addendum G)

This exhibit represents the proposed subdivision
application submitted by Layne Newman to the City of Draper which
was subsequently denied. (T-60)

That plat shows a right of way

passing through Lot 4 to Lot 5.

The right of way was visible and

apparent when the Sanders purchased their home and when they
subsequently purchased the north acre from the Ovards.
2.

The Listing Agreement
(Trial Exhibit 10-P, attached as Addendum I)

This exhibit describes the property as "down a private
lane to tree-lined seclusion."

The visual information contained

in this exhibit indicates that there is access to the property
along a private lane.

That description was consistent with the

appearance of the property in 1982 when Plaintiffs purchased the
lots.

In fact, the Affidavits submitted by the Defendants in

opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial support the fact
that the property was indeed accessible in the fall of 1982 by a
road passing through the southern parcel. (R. 238-239, 244)

Those

same Affidavits indicate that bhe appearance of the cul-de-sac has
changed dramatically from the fall of 1982, to the time when the
judge viewed the cul-de-sac in 1986.

A curb had been installed,

bushes and shrubs planted and a concrete wall was erected stemming
from the cul-de-sac. (R. 239, 240, 243)

Meanwhile, the access to

the north lot had become overgrown from nonuse which might cause
the judge to perceive the surroundings differently from how they
might have been reaonably perceived in 1982 by the Sanders. (R.
244)
3.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
(Trial Exhibit 18-D, attached as Addendum J)

This document clearly demonstrates that the Sanders were
concerned with access to the north acre.

Line 24 reads "Offer

subject to 35' right of way adjacent to Sanders property and
subject property be vacated and reverting to buyer."

This

condition is consistent with the information provided on the plat
map which Plaintiffs relied upon in making their offer. (Trial
Exhibit 15-P)

That map shows a 35' right of way as a continuation

of the main road past the Sanders residence to the northern
property.

In the present case, the Ovards knew that the property
could not be built upon without a variance. (Tr. 71, 214)

Yet

they represented it to be a subdivided lot suitable for building
purposes.

Their representations were material to the sale of

that property because the price paid for that acre would be much
lower if the buyer knew that it did not comply with the Draper
subdivision regulations and that in order to get a building permit
they would first have to petition the Board of Adjustments for a
variance.

Any potential purchaser would also risk the possibility

that a variance would not be granted and that the property might
never be developed. In addition, the buyer of that acre would be
in violation of §57-5-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) when he
or she decided to sell that "lot."
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Dugan concerned
precisely the same situation presented in this case.

The Ovards,

as owners, had a duty to affirmatively reveal the facts concerning
the variance which had been granted on the two-acre parcel and
that the north acre was not subdivided in accordance with
applicable state and municipal laws.

The Ovards further had a

duty to inform all prospective buyers that the lot in its present
state could not be developed but would require a variance from the
city before a building permit would be issued.

Their failure to

disclose such information constitutes, at a minimum, negligent
misrepresentation under the Dugan decision.

c. Plaintiffs Sustained Damages as a Direct Result of
Their Reliance Upon Defendants1 Representation.
A great deal of evidence was presented at trial
concerning the actual value of the acre of land purchased by the
Plaintiffs.

Johnathan L. Cook, M. A. I., a real estate appraiser,

testified that the true value of an acre of undevelopable land in
that area was $8,000.00.

Plaintiffs agreed to pay $26,000.00 for

that property. (Tr. 28)

Plaintiffs sustained actual damages in an

amount not less than $18,000.00.

III.

THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY BASED HIS DECISION ON HIS VIEW
OF THE PROPERTY AS IT APPEARED IN 1986.

At the conclusion of the trial proceedings, the judge
indicated he would view the surroundings.

He took the entire

matter under advisement pending the view.
In the memorandum decision issued by the court, it was
apparent that the court had relied heavily on the physical
appearance of the property when he viewed it.

The judge wrote:

Moreover, the court feels the Plaintiffs did not exercise
due diligence at the time of the purchase to determine the
status of the property. The court is also of the opinion,
after having viewed the property, that due to the location
of the property, the location and placement of the home in
front of the property, the road leading from the main
paved road ending in what appears to be somewhat of a
cal-de-sac (sic), and under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person should have been
alerted that there may be access problems associated with
the back parcel of property that should be investigated,
(emphasis added)
(R. 142-143, Findings of Fact #9 and 10)

It has been generally held that when the judge is the
trier of fact/ the judge may view the physical evidence under the
same circumstances where a jury would be so allowed.

4 Wigmore,

Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Chadbourn rev. 1972) §1169.

One

circumstance affecting the exercise of the court's discretion in
allowing a view is whether a change of condition is likely to have
occurred and that a view of the property in its present condition
might be misleading.

Ld. at §1164.

The power of the court to

order a view should be exercised with caution.

The trial judge

should be satisfied that conditions at the time he views the
premises are substantially the same as they were at the time that
the claim arose.

He must also be satisfied that a personal

inspection by him will be fair to all parties concerned and is
reasonably necessary to do justice between them.

JLd. at §1169

(quoting from Greenberg v. Waterbury, 117 Conn. 67, 73-74, 167
Atl. 83, 85 (1933)) .
In the present case, it was clearly established that the
appearance of the property in question had changed dramatically in
the six intervening years. (R. 239, 240, 243)

The Affidavits of

neighboring residents submitted by the Defendants in opposition to
Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial set forth the changes which had
occurred around those properties since 1982.

The installation of

the curb, the planting of bushes and shrubbery and the
construction of a concrete wall abutting the cul-de-sac are all
examples of the dramatic changes in the appearance of those
parcels of property. (R. 239, 240, 243)

Cases have limited the purposes for which a view might be
used.

Vickridge First & Second Addition Homeowners Association,

Inc. v. Catholic Diocese of Wichita, 212 Kan. 348, 510 P.2d 1296,
1307 (1973); Groff v. Circle K Corporation, 86 N. M. 531, 525 P.2d
891, 893 (Ct. App. 1974); Christensen v. Gensman, 333 P.2d 658
(Wash. 1958).

In Christensen, the Washington Supreme Court

defined the proper purpose of a view by the trial judge.

"The

trial judge may view the premises for the purpose of clarifying
and harmonizing testimony.

In other words, his view of the

premises is to aid him in his understanding of the evidence
introduced in the case."

(Citations omitted)

Id_. at 662.

However, the court went on to state that it would be improper for
the trial judge to view the premises for the purpose of proving
some res gestae fact not in evidence, nor may he view the premises
for the purpose of searching for extrinsic evidence to be applied
in corroborating or discrediting the testimony of a witness.

If

he does so, and his judgment is based thereon, it is reversible
error.

_Id.

This case clearly prohibits the importance given by

the judge to the present appearance of the properties at issue in
this case.

His finding that the Plaintiffs' reliance was not

reasonable was based solely upon his physical impression of the
property when he viewed it.
More recently, the Washington Supreme Court followed
Christensen when it reversed and remanded a decision by the trial
court after the judge viewed the property in dispute.

In

O'Sullivan v. Scott, 25 Wash. App. 430, 607 P.2d 1246 (1980) , the
court found that the judge relied upon his viewing of the property
in ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs.

The judge had viewed the

property after considering opposing Affidavits which addressed the
compliance of the Defendant with a previous court order.

The

record on appeal contained no evidence disputing the Affidavit
submitted by the Defendant stating that he had complied with the
court's order.
In the present case, there is no evidence on the record
that supports the judge's finding that there were access problems
apparent when looking at the property as it existed in 1982.
The judge clearly relied upon extrinsic evidence obtained in his
view of the property in finding in favor of the Defendants.

Under

the Christensen and 0'Sullivan cases, that constitutes reversible
error and Plaintiffs should be awarded a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs ask this court to reverse the decision of the
trial court below and grant them a new trial on three grounds.
First, the failure of the court to amend Plaintiffs' pleadings to
conform to the uncontested evidence.

Second, the facts clearly

support a finding of fraud and/or negligent misrepresentation on
the part of the Defendants.

And finally, Judge Noel erred in his

reliance upon the appearance of the property in 1986 in finding
that the Plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence when purchasing
the northern acre four years earlier in 1982.

DATED this

%0

day of March, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
GREEN & BERRY

^

jrick N> Green
Julie V. Lund
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDA

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to
an amended pleading within the time remaining for
response to the original pleading or within 10 days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise
orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a
party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or
defense. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it
shall so order, specifying the time therefor.

57-5-3. Maps and plats to be acknowledged, certified, approved, and recorded.
Such map or plat shall be acknowledged by such
owner before some officer authorized by law to take
the acknowledgment of conveyances of real estate,
and certified by the surveyor making such plat; if the
land is situated in any city or incorporated town such
plat or map shall be approved by its governing body,
or by some city or town officer for that purpose designated by resolution or ordinance of such governing
body; and, if the land is situated outside of any city or
incorporated town, shall be approved by the board of
county commissioners of the county, or by some
county officer for that purpose designated by resolution or ordinance of such board. When so acknowledged, certified and approved, it shall be filed and
recorded in the office of the county recorder of the
county in which the lands so platted and laid out are
situated, except that in subdivisions of less than ten
lots, which lots lie entirely within a city or incorporated town having a planning commission, or outside
a city or incorporated town in a county having a
county planning commission, land may be sold by
metes and bounds, without necessity of recording a
plat if all of the following conditions are met: (a) The
subdivision layout shall have been first approved in
writing by the planning commission, (b) the subdivision is not traversed by the mapped lines of a proposed street as shown on any official map or maps,
and does not require the dedication of any land for
street or other public purposes, and (c) if a subdivision is located in a zoned area, each lot in the subdivision meets the frontage, width and area requirements
of the zoning ordinance or has been granted a variance from such requirements by the board of adjustment.
1»53

57-5-5. Selling lots before recordation—Liability—Misdemeanor.
If any person shall still any lot so platted according
to such plat before it is made out, acknowledged, filed
and recorded as aforesaid, such person shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor for each lot which he shall sell.
1953
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This is to certify that this is a trueand
accurate copy of the records on file with
the City of Draper.
CITY RECORDER

^Barbara Sadler

March 28, 1979

To Whom it nay concern:
M. Sam Ovard and Layne Newman are applying for a variance
just North of 650 E. I38OO S.
A right of way 35 feet wide and 311 feet deep connects 13800 S.
with a 5*16 acre peice of land.
The land is not being used for anything at the present time.
There is nothing on the property or right of way except old shed
foundations which will be removed and a concrete irrigation ditch
which will stay for irrigation. The East Jordan Canal borders the
Northern property line.
We plan to build two homes on the property for ourselves to
live in.
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Addterdum D

j&AJtu^cai M<JIN_Y K_U_lFT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE

L_

This may be a legally binding form, if not understood seek other advice
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4
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co«n,v. *.••.«. J l k i h

including any of the following item* it at present attached t o the premise*-. Plumbing and heating fixture* * n d equipment including stoker and on tanks, weter heaters, and burner*, electric
light 'ixture* excluding bulb*. bathroom fixture*, toller shades, curtain rod* and fixture*, Venetian blind*, window and door screen*, linoleum, all shrub* and trees, and any other fixture*

. nrne

Cne sfr^r*.- : ! Dr;.7 ?r I r r i g a t i o n water

! 4 The following personal oroperty shall also be included a* part of the property purchased:

The

I,.,„.,_,~M7~~?0'.'T;O

11 bej>ayabi* a* follows: s

, l w . n t y . M n « Xhc'i3'n~~

" _ _ _ —
*ln>n seller apnrQves sale

v . 1 * which snail be on nr pelore

„„,,.„,

which represent* the aforedescribed deposit, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged bv v<

1V;
~ ' ; rch
1 ' _ J.l:
_!' I

delivery of deed or final contract of

t

—*',".

.

10

. and $

—•——'

each month commencing
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tooetlirr with interest I* paid; n'ovirled, however, that buyer «| his nption, at .my timo, may pay amount* in excess of the monthly

<->

,-.«vrv«-ti»«. upon tiif iifip.uo h.n.inf r, suhirct to t h f l i m i t a t i o n * of any mottqaoc or contract liv the otiv<-» hnrem as*unw'(1 Interest at

'» per annum on the unpaid portions of the
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i r» ' - All osK of to** and destruction
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RECEIPT
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This may be a legally binding form, if not understood seek other advice
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i.iid porrhave once or complete ',.i,n poi<-.ha*e a* h e r o n n m v i n e d . the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option o ' the seller.
. rctelpf _o(i*fifu<e the ontire fVedftiinary Contract between the purchaMr and the setter, and that no verbal s'ar*m#nf m a d . by
.orporated in wriMtiq herein. M is further a<»re«d that e x . c u i i n

It IS i.tid-rsf.
.1 MV<

-:..-•?•,-•.

Ins ottoi without rtamaoe to the undersigned aqent.

In t * i ' . - v n l1 'he purchaser fails to pay the t>al.im.c
'tanneil is iKiuirl. u r n and ai.rnwct dam^.ws

, - t » . l . •i.X*

T :

n t t e n acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon w t t h m

•us ti,-«isaclir»u snail he construed t 1 u«
»• this I.1.0 es t Money Meieipt aorl Offer to Purchase.

«-«

^J^^pXi^fUsA1?

(••' c ^ J-

<jr-v to c»rry out and lultill the t ' l n n a n d condition* specified above, and me seller agrees to turmsh good and marketable title w i t h abstract brouqht to date or at Seller"*

• r r "• r. t. '.r :; -

i' title insurance in the n.tmc •>! the purchaser and to make final corivevanc; bv warranly deed or ,
ialt of nth«-1 than teal pri-'oertv, sellrr wilt proviile evidence of title or nqht I n sell or lease. If either 1 arty tails SO to d o , he
ii|ht .irismq out of the t>iea<h t h e r e o l , i.Kludioq a reasonable attorney's tee.
^'
r anrers i" 1 • insider at inn of the r l toils ot the a«»nt 111 procuring a purchaser, to pay said auent .» • on 1'Mission of
•1 nas eni.-r a m m a hstuiq iPnlract w i t h any other aqent and said contract is presently eflective, t i n . t.arariraoh will be of.rto

—

.

•-

_

+-\

'
;
aqrees to pay all expenses of enforcing thi* aqree•
force or e f ^ t t t .

#

'

/
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I DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

-Ji_0_

IM . ,'ioke.s to turmsh cotite* ot this «nntract bearing all signature* to buyer and seller. Dependent upon the method u * * d , o n . of the following f o r m * mu*l be completed.)

RECEIPT
i'»wl«d<ie receipt of a fina' copy of the foreqomq agreement bearing all *tqnatures:

0

inaliv caused a final copy <•• the foreqoing aureement tiearinq all *iqnatur.* to be mailed to the
19

Q J Seuer,

, by registered m*U and return receirt

. .:;•»....-.

oate-

~^~*

( J Purchaser on

is attached hereto.

Adderdum F j

Addendum fcr

This is to certify that this is a true and
accurate copy of the records on file with
the City of Draper.

£) p *

CITY RECORDER

?=**—i—***
TSarbaraSadler~

BOLRD OF JLDJUSTKKHTS

Th*

April 12. 1979 Meeting

Meeting called to order by Chairman Too Mellenthin with the following presents
ftiane Sadler;

Gary Kelson;

Elmer Sterling; and

Andrea Zimmerman, Sec.

Meeting called to order at 8*21* p.*»
Ho. 1s

Appeal - Phil Edmunds
Charge of $136" for not getting building permit from it City of Draper,
Also $Qfc charge added to fee becauss he didn't get a building permit.
Duane Sadler aored that the Sffi charge be made as originally issued
with aeoond by Gery Kelson.
Yoting was in favor.
Question brought up aa to whether he need to get business license.
Bo. 2s

1RTDB PBCK - Yarianoe
Building is on a lit formerly less than one acre. Rimer Sterling moved
to approval variance
Seoond by Dnane Sadler, Motion earned.

Ho. }i

MQXJLL UfEgRSQH - Yarianoe
Applying for U-plex variance.
Ton Mellenthin moved to approve the variance on the duplex only.
Seoond by Kliaer Sterling. Motion oarried.
Ho. In

ISMH1S B U B H H A K - Yarianoe
Duane Sadler moved to approve said varlanoe with second by Gary Nelson.
Motion carried.
Ho. 5s

LIKE CASTES - Yarianoe
Lynn Carter was present to request 100 ft. frontage varianoe at bl(5 £•
II48OO South. Duane Sadler moved to approve varianoe vlth seoond by Elmer Sterling.
Motion oarriedt,^
Ho. 61
favor.

LAJQg MEMO*. SAM OVAED & PJLVID PIT - Yarianoe
111 of above were present. 1 Mr. Stevens, neighbor, also present in
Ton Mellenthin moved to approve the varianoe baaed on the following

a) 70 foot oul de sac; (b) 16 ft. paved eurfaoe back from main road;
•^
(0) fire hydrant and adequate waterline.
Second~by~Dagng Sadler" and motion passed unanimously.
_# ,
OSJLLD JLLSHUSSSH - Yarianoe regarding the lot size from 1 acre to .>» acres.
Slaer Sterling moved to approve varianoe with second DY Duane SaaJer, Met, t.
carried unanimously.
Meeting adjourned at $t}6

p.m.
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IN C O N S I D E R A T I O N O F your agreement to use your af fort* to present this offar to the S«fMr. ! / - - » -

•7/1)

C

J^

J**

D,

JS"*/Wl

t

iT

\

hereby deposit w i t h y o u a i earnest monay the »um of ($ .

5

secure and apply on tna purcnasa
purchase of
to sacura
or trta
tna property situated
N t u a t a d at
a t ;s_

/

r-ri^

rr

(

A~r .i

jf{_

4--^/

JZIZT

' partly

^Juirtoa)
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Oty
l^i f / i l l
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n - ? V
/ s i f *
C o u n t y . Stata of
£ /
> 4 »
^ t including any of trta following H a m * it at peasant attached to the premises: Ptumoing and heating fixtures and equipment Including stoker and oil tanks, water heaters, and burners, electric

12

Hght fixtures excluding bulbs, b a t h r o o m fixtures, roller shades, curtain rods and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door screens, linoleum, ail shrubs and trees,

« ""apt
U

faQiOZ.*

The f o i i o w n g personal property snail also be Includad as part of the property purchased:

x

Tha total purcnasa prica of » <
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shell be payable as foijows: $

\9

*

"jo

? ^ r

;

rtOQ

)

/ & Q

- ~ &

^><?ri-f

ajate.

^

%

C

aa _7£ Ze. Stpct'fs/i

19

77?

TSt/peJ?

^

'.V

^

C

t"'t'

^VO
%-~>

^

'

~

^

7 * °

. -nn f ,

i

""

"

o n

:
—

——•

-—•

- — -

,1, &,//.—7>/4^,^.,

——

"»

DOLLARS

delivery of deed or final contract of
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\

fixtures

_

which represants tna aforedetcribed daposit, racaipt of which is hereby acknowledged by y o u :

when veiier approves, sale:

tele which shall be on or before

» if ?~6*ar&

"7"CL"°

_
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i* uwixtL i
17

* n d any other
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mmojiga

ptoy*^

• / -• /
___^

;

y

,

~

'

%1

until the balance of $*_

2*

p»vm»nn

2»

purchase prica t o be included In the prescribed payments and shall begin as o l date of possasslon which shall oa on or before

30
31

of property, and axpansas o l »"»«'•««;• »»*»•&• Oorn by tna saiiar until data o l possession at which time property taxes, rents, insurance. Interest and other expenses of the property shall be
prorated as of date of possession. All other taxes and all assessments, mortgages, chattel liens and other nens, encumbrances or cnarges against the property of any nature shaTtoi paid by

32
3 3

35
3

«

together w i t h interest Is paid: provided, however, that buyar at his option, at any t i m a , may pay amounts in excass of tha monthly

upon the unpaid balance, subject to tna limitations of any mortgagt or contract by the ttu%*r fterem assumed, interest at

the seller excepti
. - _

34 I D
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lowing

Q ^ C u h n a r y Water (City

^ O t h e r

Soptic Tenk and/or Cesspool

Community System ( ^ C o n n e c t e d

g )

Private fxV>

- * © « a n n u m o n « \ * unpaid portions o
t o( the
c

/
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£]>idewalk

P l ^ C u r b and Gutter j T H S p e c l a l Street Paving

( S a n d : Vas Jx) NO ( o j .
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Contract of S4l« or lnstrum«nt of conveyance tlFbd mad* on the approvetfform of the 5fan D«pt?0f Business Regulation In the nam* of
^ff/rfr

D.
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Pfrfrytc*

Hi

<'W / / / : , ?*• f

37
This payment is received and offar is made subject to the written acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon within
34 approved the return of the money herein receipted shall cancel this offer without damage to tne undersigned agent.
3»
40
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specialjmprovemanis „ , mcluded in Ihr, sara. Sewer P 7 > C o n n e c i e d ?T)

Special Street Lighting
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d » t f r o m date hereof, and unless so
*

t

In the event the purchaser falls to pay the balance of said purchase price or complete said pure he te as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller.
oe retained as liquidated and agreed damages.

41 '
l» »« understood and agreed that the terms written In this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the purchaser and the seller, and that no verbal statement made by
4 2 ((anyone relative t o this transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein. It is further agreed tnat execution of the final contract shall
4 3 Abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase.
/

«
49
46
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MM do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill the terms and conditions specified above, and the seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title w i t h abstract brought to data or at Seller's
option a policy o l title insurance in the name of the purchaser and to make final conveyance by warranty deed r\t
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47

In the event of sale of other than real property, teller will provide evidence of title or right to sell or lease, if eitner party fails so to do, he agrees to pay ail expenses of enforcing fhte.agree-

ee

ment, or o l any right arising out o l the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

49
50

The seller agrees m consideraiion ol the elforts o l the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay said agent a commission of

^
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>n the event seller has entered into a listing contract w i t h any other agent and said contract is presently etlective, this paragraph win o e j l f noJrJrce
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(State law requires brokers to fumisn copies of this contract bearing ail signatures to buyer and seller. Oependent upon tne method used, one of the following lorms must be completed.)

RECEIPT
*4

| acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures:

Seller

'

' '""

o«ta

l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to tne
_____________________-------—-______-—_________

l

Purchaser

Q

Seller,

Q

Date

Purchaser, on

* _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . by registered mail and return receipt is attached hereto.

I fKkk)0(Xxn\ J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing
Brief of the Appellants were mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following attorney this

oO

day of March, 1989.

Thomas N. Crowther
PARSONS & CROWTHER
Attorney for Appellees
455 South 300 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Frederick N. Green
Julie V. Lund
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Appellants

